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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OPHELIA ARCHULETTA ARMENTA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
GRANDVIEW CAFE; STATE
INSURANCE FUND and INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, as
Custodian of the "Special
Fund", provided for in
35-1-68(1) UCA, 1953,

Supreme Court No. 16038

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah denying plaintiff, Ophelia Archuletta Armenta,
compensation benefits from the "Second Injury Fund", to which she
is entitled under Sections 35-1-68(1) and 35-1-69 UCA, 1953.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission denied plaintiff the benefits
provided for by §35-1-69 UCA, 1953 from the "Special Fund", hereinafter referred to as the "Seond Injury Fund".
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant on appeal State Insurance Fund respectfully asks that the decision of the Industrial Commission denying
plaintiff benefits under the provisions of 35-1-69 UCA, 1953, be
reversed by this Court, that the applicant be granted the benefits
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to which she is entitled from theSecond Injury Fund including
compensation for future medical expenses and future temporary
total disability, and that the defendant State Insurance Fund be
reimbursed by the Second Injury Fund for its proportionate share
of medical compensation and temporary total compensation benefits
already paid.
FACTS
The facts of this case are as stated by the plaintiffappellant in her Brief.

The defendant on appeal State Insurance

Fund accepts and incorporates herein that statement of facts.
ARGUMENT
POiclT I.
THE SECOND INJURY FUND IS LIABLE FOR A PORTION OF THE
COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO THE APPLICANT EQUAL TO THE PERCENTAGE OF
HER PERMANENT INCAPACITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO A PRE-EXISTING CONDTION.
The defendant on appeal State Insurance Fund joins the
plaintiff on appeal in her contention that she is entitled to permanent disability compensation from the Second Injury Fund for that
portion of her disability attributable to her pre-existing condition.
The defendant State Insurance Fund agrees that the Second Injury Fund
is liable for its proportionate share of future medjcal expenses, and
further contends that the State Insurance Fund is entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for its proportionate share of medical
expenses already paid by the State Insurance Fund.
As noted by the appellant, the Administrative Law Judge found
that she suffered a 20% permanent physical impairment as a result of
prior neck operations, and a 20% permanent physical impairment of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-2- OCR, may contain errors.

body as a whole relative to the right upper extremity and neck injury
resulting from the industrial accident of June 29, 1974.
her total impairment under the AMA chart to be 36%.

He found

These findings

were based on the report of Dr. Holbrook who served as a one-man
medical panel in this case.
The Industrial Commission denied the applicant Second
Injury Fund benefits despite Dr. Holbrook's conclusion that nalf of
her 36% impairment was attributable to a pre-existing condition.
In so doing, the Commission once again ignored the clear directives
of the applicable statute and definitive interpretations of the law
by this Court.

Once again, this Court is called upon to require the

Commission to award benefits to which an applicant is legally entitled
from the Second Injury Fund which is administered and controlled by the
Commission.
The Commission denied these benefits because, in its opinion,
"there is no substantially greater increase in disability than would
have occurred had not the pre-existing condition existed .
This conclusion is based on Dr. Holbrook's remark that "it is difficult at this time to state that the neck is worse as a result of
this injury than it was prior to this injury."

The Commission obvious-

ly found insufficient Dr. Holbrook's report that the applicant had a
20% impairment as a result of prior neck operations, and a 20% impairment relative to her right upper extremity and neck aggravation.
In fact, this evidence itself compels the payment of Second Injury
Fund benefits, and only by misconstruing the statute could the Commission
justify a refusal to make such an award.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In pertinent part, §35-1-69(1) UCA, 1953 provides:
If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease or
congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury.
that results in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than he would have incurred if he had
not had the pre-existing incapacity, compensation and
medical care . . . shall be awarded on the basis of the
combined injuries, but the liability of the employer
. • shall be for the industrial injury only and the
remainder shall be paid out of the Special Fund provided for in §35-1-68.
This section was construed by this Court in the case of
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617, 619
1977).

(Utah

In that case, the applicant was 30% disabled after her

industrial accident.

Twenty percent of her disability was caused

by her industrial back injury; ten percent was psychosomatic pain
attributable to a pre-existing phsychological condition .
. if the requirement of the statute is met, that
is if the resulting permanent incapacity is substantially
greater than if the pre-existing incapacity had not
existed, the proportional causation must be found and
that portion attributable to the previous condition
paid out of the Special Fund.
The requirement that the pre-existing condition
combines with the later injury to cause a "substantially
greater" permanent incapacity does not mean that the
former must be greater than the latter.
It simply
means that it be some definite and measurable portion
of the causation of the disability.
It surely cannot
be doubted that 30% is substantially greater than 20%, nor
that 10% disability is itself substantial in that is
definite and measurable. Consequently, inasmuch as
it appears that the pre-existing condition increased
the resulting disability by 1/3, it follows that under
the requirements of the statute, the medical expenses
as well as the compensation award should have been
aportioned 2/3 from the employer and 1/3 from the
Special Fund.
As a result of her industrial accident, the applicant
in this case became 18% disabled.

Her total disability after the
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accident was 36%.

Eighteen percent of her permanent disability is

directly attributable to her pre-existing incapacity.

She is

entitled to benefits from the Second Injury Fund because her prior
incapacity is a measurable portion of her total incapacity after
the accident.
It was apprently significant to the Commission that the
applicant's prior incapacity was specifically related to her neck,
whereas the accident caused a disability of the right upper extremity
as well as the neck.

However, the law does not require that the

prior incapacity result in a substantially greater disability to
the same area of the body which becomes disabled as a result of
the industrial injury.

Such a requirement would be inconsistent with

the interpretation given the statute by this Court in the Ortega
case as quoted above.
Some states require by statute that an industrial injury
aggravate the pre-existing condition before their Second Injury
Fund has any liability.

That is the law in Arizona, for example.

See A.R.S. §23-1065(a) (5).

However this requirement is inconsistent

with the law of most states and should not be read into our statute.
Professor Larson discusses this issue in Vol. 2 §59.32 of Workmen's
Compensation Law at pp. 10310-10314.
The typical Second Injury statute speaks of a
second injury "added to" a pre-existing injury or
disability.
The question sometimes arises whether
the second injury must be shown to have been related
to or to have acted upon the prior injury--as, for
example loss of fingers of the same hand.
It is
generally held that no special relation between the
injuries is necessary, so long as the e~~st~n~e of
the former substantially augments the d~sab~l~ty
ensuing from the latter . . . . Although the prior
impairment need not combin~ with the compensable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the disability before the Special Fund can become
liable.
In other words, it is not enough to show
that the claimant had some kind of handicap if that
handicap contributed nothing to the final disability.
It is the significance of the increase in the final overall
disability that determines the liability of the Second Injury Fund.
If an industrial injury itself results in total disability, or if
the prior incapacity is the sort which, in combination with the
industrial injury, does not appreciablly alter the claimant's physical
incapacity, the Second Injury Fund has no liability.

But in this

case, it is certain that the prior incapacity substantially increased
the overall incapacity from which the applicant suffered as a result
of her injury.

Neither the statute, nor the rulings of this court,

nor the law of Workmen's Compensation in general, require that an
industrial accident aggravate the pre-existing condition in order
to qualify an applicant for Second Injury Fund benefits.
POINT II.
THE SECOND INJURY FUND IS LIABLE FOR ITS PROPORTIONATE
SHARE OF COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES AND TEMPORARY DISABILITY.
The appellant seeks a ruling that the Second Injury Fund
is liable for its proportionate share of medical expenses which
she may incur in the future.

The defendant on appeal State Insurance

Fund joins in this assertion, and contends that the Second Injury
Fund should be held liable for its pro rata share of medical expenses
already paid by the State Insurance Fund.

Furthermore, the Second

Injury Fund should be ordered to pay an equivilant share of temporary
total disability compensation whether already paid by the State
Insurance Fund, or yet to be incurred.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This Court is well aware that the Industrial Commission
has categorically refused to aportion medical expenses and ternporary total disability compensation in cases where the Second
Injury Fund has been found liable for a portion of permanent
disability compensation.

(See the Brief of Plaintiffs on Appeal

in Supreme Court cases No. 15882, No. 15881, and No. 15796
currently pending before this Court.)

However, Section 35-l-69

UCA, 1953, and this Court's construction of the provision in the
Ortega case, supra, leave no doubt that the commission is required
to aportion compensation for medical expenses as well as temporary
and permanent compensation benefits between the employer and the
Second Injury Fund in any case where an applicant's permanent
incapacity has been measurably increased by a pre-existing condition.
As noted earlier, Section 35-l-69 UCA, 1953, provides that
an employer's liability "for such compensation and medical care
shall be

for the industrial injury only and the remainder shall

be paid out of the Special Fund.
In the Ortega decision, supra, this Court held that
medical expenses as well as compensation were to be apportioned
in cases where the liability of the Second Injury Fund was established.
But it will be noted that the statute makes no
distinction between the award for compensation and
medical expenses; and that if the requirement of the
statute is met, that is, if the resulting permanent
incapacity is substantially greater than if the preexisting incapacity had not existed, the proportional
causation must be found and that portion attributable
to the previous condition paid out of the Special Fund.
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Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, supra, 562
P.2d at 619.
Furthermore, the definition of compensation in the Workmen's Compensation Act, makes it clear that temporary total disability
benefits are "compensation", and therefore subject to apportionment
as well.
(6)

Compensation shall mean the payment of benefits
provided for in this title §35-1-44(6) UCA, 1953.

Accordingly, the defendant on appeal State Insurance Fund
asserts its right to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for
compensation for medical expenses and temporary total disability
benefits previously expended in an amount equal to its proportionate
share of permanent disability compensation.

Furthermore, the Second

Injury Fund should be ordered to pay the same portion of any future
medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits to which
this applicant becomes entitled.
DATED this~ day of December, 1978.
BLACK

&

MOORE

TIMOTHY C. HOUPT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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Salt Lake City, Utah

84111 and to Mr. Frank v. Nelson, Attorney

General's Office, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114.
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